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ABSTRACT
The macro-economic and micro-economic evidences makes a persuasive case for cities as important
centers for productive efficiency, innnovation, and economic growth. For cities to achieve their full
economic potential, however, complementary public services are required. This paper reviews the
arguments and the evidence for the efficient financing and governance of city public services.
Against the criterion of efficiency, city services should be limited to those services valued by city
residents; financing should assign residential taxes to residential services and business land taxes and









In 1904, St Louis, Missouri hosted the World’s Fair, and this year is its 100
th anniversary.
The seven month fair hosted exhibits from 62 countries and had an attendance of over 2 million
visitors.  At the time of the Fair, St Louis itself had a legitimate claim to being one of the premiere
cities in the United States. It was the country’s fourth largest city behind New York, Philadelphia,
and Chicago and  had an average worker’s wage that was 20 percent higher than the national per
capita income.  The city’s population had grown at an annual rate of 4 percent over the previous
twenty years, roughly twice as fast the national overall population growth.  St. Louis had become
the gateway to the West.  At the time of the 1904 World’s Fair, the song “Meet Me in St. Louis”
promised a good job, a good home, and a good time.  
Today, on the 100
th  year anniversary of the Fair, few willingly accept that invitation.  City
population has been in a steady decline since its peak at 856,796 residents in 1950.  At the time of
the most recent U.S. Census (2000), average city income is $16,000 per person, 26 percent below
the national average.  The city’s unemployment rate was 6.6 percent compared to a national average
rate of 4 percent.  The rate of poverty for St. Louis residents was 25.7 percent, roughly twice the
national average.  It is true that economic trends have been moving against older industrial cities,
but even against eleven sister cities of the Northeast and Midwest St Louis offers a poor comparison.
She  ranks 12th of 12 in current rates of population growth (negative and actually last of all large
cities in the United States), 3
rd highest in percent of residents living in poverty, 3
rd highest  in the rate
of city unemployment, highest in the rate of crime, and 10
th in the rate of real appreciation in median
city home values.   In 1952, St. Louis had 51 percent of the region’s employment within its borders.
Today only 12 percent of area jobs are in the city.  Over the past 50 years, the suburbs have been2
gaining jobs at the rate of 2.7 percent per year, while the city has been losing jobs at the rate of 1.7
percent per year. 
What happened?  St Louis’s decline was, to an important degree, a product of its own doing.
City public spending per resident in St. Louis rose at an annual real rate of 3.4 percent over the
period 1955 to 2000, compared to a national average annual rate of growth of 2 percent for all large
U.S. cities including her eleven Northeast and Midwest comparison cities.  The causes of high city
spending were high growth rates in public employee compensation and a rising ratio of public
employees to city residents.  Growing city poverty played a role too.  Facing a potentially significant
gap between taxes paid and services received, it is not difficult to see why the middle class and
businesses stopped “meeting in St. Louis.” 
On January 13, 1999, The Governor of the central bank of Brazil resigned and the country
devalued the national currency, the real, by 8 percent.  The Brazilian stock market fell by 10 percent
over the next month and the yield on Brazil’s dollar bonds rose by 400 basis points relative to U.S.
Treasuries.  As two of Brazil’s leading trading partners, the  prices of Argentinian and Mexican
bonds fell as well.   Shares in U.S. banks with significant Latin American exposure fell sharply too.
While the Brazilian financial markets have now stabilized, there was a significant temporary
interruption in the flow of capital into the economy and a slowing of national growth.   
What happened?  For much of the previous two decades, Brazilian budgetary policies had
been determined from the “bottom-up.”  Local politicians in the nation’s largest cities controlled
local service provision and, as a consequence, local votes.  Local votes determined state election
outcomes, and state elections for senators and governors drove national policy.  The best political
strategy for those wanting to hold national office was to provide nationally collected tax revenues3
to the nation’s largest cities.   Having broken the connection between revenues collected and
services provided, the mayors of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and other large cities were never held
responsible for the management of their local budgets.  Rather than raise local taxes, mayors lobbied
for more grants.  When grants slowed, mayors borrowed money from state and national banks.
When the local debt was not repaid by the cities, the banks demanded, and received, a deficit bailout
from the central government.  To pay for the bailouts, the central government itself chose to borrow
money.  In the end, local fiscal excesses became national debts.  When national debt repayment was
postponed in 1999 and the currency devalued, Brazil fell into a financial crisis.  Once again,
mismanaged city finances damaged the private economy – this time the economy of an entire
country. 
 This essay outlines what might be done to avoid the damaging fiscal histories of a St. Louis
or of the entire Brazilian local sector, for their stories are not exceptional. 
II.  Cities and Value
Cities exist because of the economic and social advantages of closeness.  Today, a city’s role
is to serve as the economy’s idea centers, the place where product innovation occurs, new deals are
done, and the creative arts can flourish.  Philadelphia and Boston (health care), Tel Aviv, Bangalore,
and San Francisco (hardware/software), London, Tokyo, and  New York (finance and the arts),
Nashville and Paris (music), Bombay and Los Angeles (entertainment), Milan, Paris and New York
(fashion) are all examples of cities that successfully encourage idea exchange, innovation, and new
product development.  Today’s productive cities support valued creativity through the provision of
efficient telecommunication networks, safe and walkable streets, and an educated workforce; these4
are the  essential city services in today’s successful cities.
What has always made cities work as economic centers – from Manchester, England in the
1700's to New York City, London, and Tokyo today –  are agglomeration economies, the gain in
efficiency which comes from having many firms and workers in close proximity to one another.  A
growing body of empirical research demonstrates the importance of city agglomeration  for today’s
economy.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) find that doubling aggregate employment density in a U.S.
county increases the productivity of all county workers by an average of 6 percent; Ciccone (2002)
found similar gains in worker efficiency from agglomeration for European regions.  Beardsell and
Henderson (1999) find doubling high tech employment density raises overall factor productivity of
high tech firms by 6 percent after one year and perhaps by as much as 17 percent after four years.
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) provide strong evidence that these economies are greatest within one
mile of the center of current firm concentration and are typically exhausted within five miles.
Efficiencies from firm and worker agglomeration are economically important and, particularly
important for our story,  the benefits are localized to the agglomerating city’s economy. Who
benefits from an efficiently organized city are the workers who work there, the homeowners who
live there, and the entrepreneurs who have invested in the city’s land and structures; see Rauch
(1993).  Both theoretically and  empirically, cities with more spatially concentrated economic
activities are more economically valued cities.  
III.  Cities and Finances
Yet for any city to realize its full economic potential, the efficient provision of city-specific
infrastructure and public services is essential.  City firms need roads, bridges, and5
telecommunication networks and city residents need education, safe streets, and clean and healthy
environments.   These are the tasks of city government.  Efficient city finances will require, first,
an appropriate assignment of spending and taxing powers and then, second, a structure of city
political institutions and rules of governance to ensure these assigned powers are used maximize
resident welfare and firm profitability.  Even with appropriate assignment and governance, however,
there may be instances in which state or national government assistance in the form in
intergovernmental grants-in-aid will be needed to help city governments maximize city economic
value.  Here I outline what it takes for city finances to be efficient.  Table 1 summarizes the analysis.
City Services: What public services should the efficient city government provide?
Successful cities require public services and infrastructure that complement private capital and labor
in production and create physical and social environments valued by the cities’ residents. For
economic efficiency, city governments should be limited to financing those services with spatially
confined spillovers or congestible sharing technologies.   Services with significant spatial spillovers
should be financed by higher levels of government, as should government services such as national
security with significant economies of scale (“publicness”) in production.  Candidate city services
will include: access and neighborhood roads, communication networks, airports and public transit,
sewer and water infrastructure, parks and recreation, public health, libraries and cultural centers,
police and fire services, courts and prisons, and K-12 education.  What city governments should not
do, at least from their own tax resources, is redistribute incomes.  Mobile upper income households
and businesses will simply leave the city and in the process undermine city agglomeration
economies and then finally city economic efficiently; see Haughwout and Inman (2001; 2002).
Poverty services should be financed at least at the level of the metropolitan area and more ideally6
by state or national governments; see Brown and Oates (1987) and Inman (2003a).  Table 1 lists the
public services the efficient city should provide. 
City Financing: Current period services should be financed by current period taxes and user
fees; future period services should be financed by future period taxes and user fees facilitated
through the issuance of public debt.  
Taxes: Economists identify two forms of taxation: source-based taxation that taxes factors
of production where they are employed and taxes goods and services where they are purchased, and
resident-based taxation that taxes factors of production by owners’ residences and taxes goods and
services by consumers’ residences.  To the extent a city resident is both a producer and a consumer
of a city good or service then any city tax on that good or service will be, by definition, both a
source-based and a resident-based tax. The taxation of resident-owned city housing is the important
example.  
But most taxes are either source-based or resident-based.  Prominent source-based city taxes
include: 1) taxes on city employees’ wages regardless of residence (e.g., a commuter tax); 2) taxes
on city firms’ capital or profits (e.g., commercial-industrial property taxes);  3) taxes on local retail
sales; and 4) taxes on city firms’ total sales (e.g., a gross receipts tax or turnover tax).  Prominent
resident-based city taxes include: 1) taxes on residents’ wages or more generally all income, and as
mentioned, 2) a tax on resident-owned properties.  Efficient city financing should pick that mix of
taxes which maximizes the profitability of city firms and the welfare of city residents. 
Most cities use source-based taxation for two quite understandable reasons.  They are easy
to administer as the collecting agent is typically a firm or business located within the city, and at
least initially, a significant share of the burden of such taxes may fall upon non-voting taxpayers7
residing outside  the city.  Unfortunately, source-based taxation often has large negative effects on
the overall economic performance of the city’s private economy. (It is true that such taxes will
collect revenues from outsiders using city services, but there are more efficient ways to charge those
visitors, for example user fees and excise taxes targeted to the outsiders’ access to (parking, rail,
airport, roadway fees) and stays within (hotel taxes) the city.)  Commercial-industrial property taxes,
taxation of commuter workers, and the taxation of  firm output or sales all reduce firm profitability
at the taxing location. Unless the resulting reduction in firm profits is matched by at least a fully
compensating profit increase from added city services, the firm, constrained to earn the competitive
rate of return, must leave the city. From the perspective of economic efficiency, there is little to
recommend source-based taxation. 
How cities should  finance their local public services is through user fees and resident-based
taxation for residential services and user fees and business-based land value taxes for business
services.  The resident tax might be a tax on residential property or resident wage or income, the
latter administered as a locally decided additional tax rate (called “piggybacking”) applied to all, or
perhaps just a locally decided portion, of the state or federal income tax bases.  Business should be
charged a combination of user fees for the use of city services (e.g., water, trash, and parking fees)
and then a tax on the value of business land when the administration of user fees is not possible (e.g.,
police and fire services and general infrastructure maintenance).  Pittsburgh (US) and Queensland
(Australia) have both successfully administered a business land tax; see Oates and Schwab (1997).
Table 1 lists an appropriate means for financing each city service. 
Borrowing: For the financing of the construction and maintenance costs of city infrastructure
– schools, public transit, water works, airports, communication networks, major access roads,8
prisons and courts, waste treatment facilities – economic theory is clear: Tax payments should be
smoothed over the productive life of the government asset through the use of long-term borrowing;
see Barro (1979) and Table 1.  Ideally, taxes on the resulting improvement in the value of city land
should then be used to repay the debt’s principal and interest and all on-going costs of maintenance.
 The now common use of “tax increment financing” (TIF’s) for city capital projects illustrates the
feasibility this approach; see Brueckner (2001).  However, if such assessments prove difficult  –
what is the “reach” of economic benefits from the new sports stadium or museum? – then city-wide
taxes on residential incomes or property should be used to fund borrowing for residential projects
and, similarly, city-wide taxes on business land should be used to fund business-related  projects.
Debt for projects which benefit both residents and businesses such should be repaid by city-wide
taxation on both resident and business tax bases. 
To ensure fiscal accountability, cities should not be allowed to use city long-term debt to
finance an annual shortfall between current spending (labor, materials, and interest costs) and
current revenues (taxes, fees, and grants) by borrowing “off-the-books” through special project
accounts,  by re-classifying current period expenditures such as janitor salaries as “capital outlays”
(once a New York City favorite),  underfunding of defined-benefit public employee pensions, or by
just “rolling-over” last year’s deficit into this year’s budget.  Enron’s chief accountant and financial
officer did nothing their public sector counterparts had not tried long before; see Inman (1983).
There are two potentially important consequences for economic efficiency of undetected
deficit financing.  First if repaid by city taxpayers, as was the case for New York City and
Philadelphia deficits, city property values then fall by the discounted present value of all required
taxes. Hidden city deficits therefore create uncertainty for new investors, uncertainty which will9
discourage future investment in an otherwise productive city’s economy.  Second, if not repaid by
city residents – a “bailout” as in case of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo – then the deficit acts as an
implicit subsidy to current accounts spending.  As a consequence, city spending will be inefficiently
too large; see Inman (2003b).  To control the first inefficiency, city deficits should be actively
monitored by reputable accountants using “generally accepted accounting practices” (GAAP) and
the city’s surplus or deficit position made known to all potential investors in city properties.
Investors will then be able to discount (“capitalize”) future taxes into the price they pay for city
assets.  Lacking reputable monitoring, however, deficit regulation through balanced budget rules
may be needed; see Bohn and Inman (1996). To control the second inefficiency, the national
government must adopt a credible position against city government bailouts, much like President
Ford’s response when New York City requested federal assistance following its 1974 fiscal crisis:
“Ford to City: Drop Dead.” (New York Daily News, October 29, 1975); see Inman (2003b).  City
borrowing is an important tool for efficient city financing, but it must be watched, publicized, and
if necessary, regulated.
Fiscal Organization:   In organizing the responsibility for city finances, our objective is to
ensure that the each dollar raised in taxes is matched by at least a compensating dollar of economic
benefits from the provision of city services.  The fiscal performance of competitive U.S. suburbs
provides compelling evidence in favor of a decentralized system of public financing for city services
as a way to ensure marginal benefits exceed or are at least equal to marginal costs in the provision
of city services.  Mobile and informed households and firms coupled with resident-based taxation
for residents, as noted by Hamilton (1975), coupled with business land taxes and user fees for firms,
as noted by Fischel (1975), will lead to such an efficient matching of benefits and costs in local10
budgets.  Families and firms that want more or less public services move to locations that provide
what they require and, through targeted resident and business taxes and user fees, pay the marginal
costs of the extra services they consume. This sorting of firms and households into locations by their
favored service/tax packages has become known as  “Tiebout shopping,” after Charles Tiebout
(1956) who first described the logic of such a marketplace.  The empirical evidence strongly
supports the efficacy of such a system of fiscal governance; see Brueckner (1982) and Rubinfeld
(1987).
Can the same combination of resident and business-based taxation coupled with firm and
household sorting also work to improve fiscal performance in large cities?  It’s certainly possible,
but first a significant reconfiguration of governing responsibilities for city services will be needed.
Again for economic efficiency, service responsibility should be based on a simple principle:
Neighborhood services should be  financed and managed by neighborhood governments and  city-
wide services should be financed and managed by city government.  The key distinction between
neighborhood and city-wide services is the geographic or population size of the community needed
to provide the service efficiently, allowing for congestion in resident and business use and service
spillovers across locations.   For most residential city services economies of scale in population are
exhausted with about 20,000 residents and spillovers are rare between communities.  For example,
education, police and fire protection, trash collection, parks and recreation, and libraries can be well
financed and managed by  relatively small, neighborhood governments.  Where economies of scale
or service spillovers are more significant – for example, water and electrical services,
telecommunications, trash and waste disposal (but not collection), public health, public
transportation, museums and stadiums, courts and prisons – then city-wide fiscal governance will11
be appropriate.  See Table 1. 
Whether managed at the neighborhood or city level, residents should retain the legal right
to contract with private suppliers for service provision.  The option to “contract out” is particularly
appropriate when households are not mobile but suppliers are.   The bidding process for the right
to provide public services gives immobile residents, often the city’s lower income households, the
same competitive edge that mobile middle income families now enjoy from Tiebout shopping.  But
the contracting process must be done with care.  It works best when private suppliers’ expertise and
capital are easily reproduced and entry barriers are low (Williamson, 1976), and when the important
dimensions of service output, particularly service quality, are relatively easy to monitor from outside
the firm (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).  If service quality from the contractor can only be
assured by watching the daily performance of the supplier, then there is little to distinguish
managing a contractor from managing one’s own public employees; you may as well just call the
provider “government.”  Finally when contracting out, it is essential that the neighborhood or city
government retain ownership of any unique assets essential for service provision.  Public ownership
prevents contractor “hold-up” and monopoly pricing.  Services that might be provided successfully
through contracting out include running and maintaining public transit and communication
networks, water and sewer services, roadway and park  maintenance, libraries, cultural centers, and
trash collection.  Services likely to be best provided directly by local government, for reasons of
assuring quality control,  include police and fire services, public health, courts and prisons, and
(though many might disagree) K-12 education. See Table 1.   If contracting out is the chosen option,
then currently unionized city workers should be allowed to bid (experience counts), and one supplier
might service several contiguous neighborhoods as production or purchasing economies require; see12
Donahue (1989).
Just as city resident services are best managed by an efficient combination of neighborhood
and city governments, so too will be business services, where neighborhood business services might
include police and fire, trash collection, and open space maintenance.  The decision by many U.S.
cities to allow geographically concentrated firms to create  “business improvement districts” (BID’s)
with supplemental taxing and spending powers for district specific services illustrates both the
administrative feasibility and the potential economic attractiveness of the “neighborhood” approach
for governing local business services; see Briffault (1999).  Here too, when economically
appropriate, the business improvement district should be allowed to contract out to private firms for
the provision of neighborhood services.  Again, see Table 1. 
There is no reason to think that the families and firms who choose to live and work within
the city are any less informed about the quality of their local public goods than their suburban
counterparts.  Just as we organize local service provision to give choice to suburban residents, so
too should we organize the provision of city services.  Choice and competition, whether through
neighborhood governments or through contracting out, go a long way towards ensuring more
efficient city finances and, in the end, maximal firm productivity and household welfare;  Rouse
(1998), Hoxby (2000), and Holmes, deSimone, and Rupp (2003) provide initial evidence on the
point for K-12 education, one of the most important city services.
Fiscal Governance: Once the appropriate financing and organizational structures are in
place, the task remains to actually choose the level of city, or neighborhood, spending and taxes.
Again we seek to align service marginal benefits with the marginal costs of taxation. Costs are
usually known, but how are benefits to be revealed?   It is here that we need political institutions and13
rules for governance.
Residential Services: Citizens  reveal their preferences for city services by voting for city
spending, either directly through a referendum or indirectly through the election of a local
representative.  Though there are many alternative ways to aggregate votes, majority rule has much
to recommend it.  Specifically, it finds a compromise or median position when one exists; see Young
(1997).  
While there is no guarantee that the median chosen position will be efficient in the economic
sense, it can come close.  As long as (1) the efficient residential tax structure applies; (2) all citizens
vote; (3) citizen preferences for services are separable in the sense that the chosen level of one
service (e.g., education) does not influence the preferred level for another good (e.g., police
protection); and (4) the distribution of preferences for any public service is not “too badly skewed,”
then the majority rule outcome for each public service will approximately satisfy efficiency’s
requirement that social marginal benefits equal social marginal costs; see Bowen (1943) and
Bergstrom (1979).   It does not matter if the budget is set by a referendum for each public service
or by a “mayor” or “council” elected at-large.  In both cases, budget outcomes converge towards the
overall median allocation; see Shepsle (1979).   
When preferences are not separable, however, then the ordering of the referenda can affect
the chosen allocation.  In this case, the agenda matters and the agenda-setter can become a dictator.
It is essential therefore that the agenda-setter be elected by the citizens. Now city and neighborhood
budgets are best decided not by issue-by-issue referenda but rather by  elected city or neighborhood
representative government.  Representative city government can take either of two forms:
legislative-only or council government or executive-only or strong mayor government.  14
Council governance has a problem, however: policy gridlock.  Three or more legislators who
differ on how best to spend city money may never be able to reach a majoritarian agreement.  A
majority of the legislators can always team up to disadvantage a minority, but the excluded minority
then has a strong incentive to offer a slightly better deal to one of the majority members to form a
new majority.  But that budget is then threatened by another deal and a new majority.  So it goes,
with the risk that no budget gets approved at all. One way to escape gridlock is through legislative
log-rolling, allowing each legislator to submit his or her most favored project for inclusion in the
budget.  To avoid gridlock and the risk of no new spending, legislators now vote to include all new
initiatives.  Such budgeting is likely to be very inefficient, however, much like what happens when
a group of friends agree to share the dinner check.  Why order salad when you share the costs of
everyone else’s steak and lobster?   At the end of the evening the dinner bill is very expensive, and
for the same reasons, so too will be the city’s budget.   
Further, the more legislators around the city council’s “dinner table,” the larger will be the
per resident or per legislator budget.  Baqir’s (2002) study of city budgeting finds that, all else
equal, doubling the size of a typical city council, say from the study’s sample mean of seven to
fourteen members, leads to a 20 percent increase in city spending per resident.  Inman’s (1995) case
study of Philadelphia provides more direct but consistent evidence on the point.  In 1979, the
leadership of Philadelphia’s then nearly all white (there was one black councilman) city council got
caught seeking bribes in the federal government’s Abscam sting operation.  Six of seventeen council
members were either convicted or forced to resign, all just before the city’s November election.  As
a result, six new Black and Hispanic members were elected to city council.  It is fair to think of this
result as a 33 percent increase in effective council membership, as the majority of Philadelphia’s15
minority neighborhoods received effective representation for the first time.  The budgetary
consequence of this “natural experiment” was a one-time 25 percent increase in city-wide spending
on neighborhood services and a 5 percent increase in overall city spending.
Fortunately, city government is destined neither to gridlock nor to log-rolling.   The strong
executive form of governance – a neighborhood or city-wide elected executive granted broad
agenda-setting powers and a line-item veto – provides a middle ground. Projects whose
neighborhood-wide (for neighborhood services) and city-wide (for city services) benefits do not
exceed their costs will never appear on the agenda, or if they do, they will be vetoed.  Strong
executives, perhaps supported by strong local political parties, will typically be able to sustain those
vetoes through their control over the votes of the legislature’s party members; see Fitts and Inman
(1992). Budgets in strong mayor cities are typically less expensive, and arguably more efficient, than
the “something for everyone” budgets normally found in council-only cities; see Baqir (2002).
Business Services:   Owners of businesses within the city, unless they are residents as well,
are not allowed to participate directly in the setting of city fiscal policies.  The exception to this rule
is in setting policies for “business improvement districts” or BID’s.  BID’s are business associations
created by state law and granted supplemental taxing, borrowing, and spending authority for district
specific services and capital improvements that benefit business; see Briffault (1999).  Little careful
thought has been given to how BID’s might best decide their assigned fiscal policies, however.  Here
the new literature on shareholders rights and corporate governance may be instructive.  In its
fundamental form, a BID is a much like a corporation with business property owners within the BID
acting as stockholders whose “share” holdings are proportional to the value of their of business
property.   Like the corporation, the sole objective of the BID is to maximize the value of business16
(stockholder) property wealth.  Much as the rule of one share-one vote is the efficient voting rule
for corporate control (Harris and Raviv, 1988), wealth-based voting – votes proportional to the
market value of property held within the BID – will typically be the efficient means for deciding the
BID’s public goods spending.  Such a rule will allocate greater voting power to the largest property
owners in the BID, creating appropriate incentives to collect information on the effects of BID-wide
services on value and to ensure efficient monitoring of the BID’s management staff; see Shleifer and
Vishny (1997).  Small shareholders must not be ignored, however, particularly if district projects
have differential effects on the value of types of properties. Wealth-based voting insures all property
owners will have a say.
Shared Infrastructure: The primary beneficiaries of city-wide infrastructure investments that
benefit both residents and businesses will be the residential and business property owners within the
city; see Haughwout and Inman (2001).  Shared city-wide infrastructure includes access roads and
boulevards, telecommunication networks, subways and buses, courts and prisons, airports, parking
garages, and sewerage and water systems.  Such investments should be debt financed with principal
and interest paid using land taxation.  Since the ultimate beneficiaries of such investments are
property owners, city-wide referenda for approval of debt issuance using wealth-based voting
designed to include owners of  residential and business property is likely to be efficient.  It seems
appropriate to allow the residentially elected city mayor to set the agenda for city-wide infrastructure
referenda, perhaps in consultation with BID representatives.
Fiscal Assistance: As a general rule city residents and firms should be solely responsible for
the financing and management of city services listed in Table 1, but there are two instances when
outside fiscal assistance may be appropriate.   The first arises when the city provides a public service17
which qualifies as a national or state constitutionally protected “merit good” demanding equal
provision to all residents.   K-12 education is the prominent U.S. example with protection provided
by state constitutions;  see Inman and Rubinfeld (1979) and Murray, et. al. (1998).  Protection comes
either as guaranteed equal access to tax resources for the financing of education – called “tax base
equalization” – or as equal access to a court-defined minimal level of school spending for all
children.  Even when such protections are not constitutionally required by the state, city residents
might wish to offer their own protections for all city children.  
To achieve either standard, matching aid is the efficient policy response; see Inman (1999).
To ensure all neighborhoods finance local education from a common tax base, local council own tax
revenues should be matched at the rate: mn = (B*/Bn - 1), where B* is the target common tax base
per child and Bn is the neighborhood’s tax base per child.  Wealthy neighborhoods where  B* < Bn
contribute revenue into the aid program (mn < 0), while poorer neighborhoods where B* > Bn receive
equalization aid (mn > 0).  Equalization aid received equals mnA(JnABn).  Total neighborhood revenues
will now equal own tax revenues (JnABn) plus equalization aid, or  Revenues =  JnABn +  mnA(JnABn)
= JnABn(1 + mn) = JnABn(B*/Bn) = JnAB*.  Each locally chosen tax rate raises revenues from a common
tax base, just as required for tax base equalization. 
To ensure that all children receive a minimal level of school spending, the efficient matching
grant should stimulate spending in low performing neighborhoods while leaving spending unaffected
in high spending neighborhoods.  Own neighborhood spending is often well described by a log-
linear relationship between spending (gn), neighborhood average income (In, or other pro-education
attributes), and the net cost of a dollar spent (1 - mn): gn = In
"(1 - mn)
-$, where " is the income
elasticity of demand for spending and $ is the (absolute value of ) the price elasticity of demand for18
school spending; see Rubinfeld (1987).  To ensure minimal standards for all children,
neighborhoods predicted to spend gn < g* should receive a matching grant at the rate mn = 1 -
(I
"/$/g*
1/$).  With such aid, gn = g*.    Neighborhoods predicted to spend gn $g* already achieve the
minimal standard and therefore receive no aid: mn / 0.  The minimal standard matching rate falls
towards 0 as neighborhoods value education more highly (i.e., as I rises) and rises as the minimum
standard increases.
The second case for fiscal assistance to the city budget occurs when the city provides a
service with significant positive economic spillovers to non-residents.  Plausible examples include
city infrastructure spending for intercity transit connections, water and air quality, and
telecommunication networks.  Residents and city firms may fail to fully internalize the full social
benefits of such services when deciding city investment – that is, city-only marginal benefits (CMBc)
may be less than social marginal benefits (SMBc): NcACMBc = SMBc, where Nc > 1.  Again a
matching grant for city own spending on the relevant service is appropriate, now specified as:  mc
= [1 - (1/Nc)]; see Inman (1999).   Larger marginal spillovers (Nc increases) require larger matching
grants.  Such grants should be funded by the largest political jurisdiction affected by city spillovers,
generally the city’s immediate state or adjacent  states.  See Table 1.    
Are We Asking Too Much?  The fiscal and political institutions of city financing proposed
here require city residents and firms to monitor the provision of ten or so local services and three
local tax rates and to vote three times – for a mayor, for a neighborhood or BID representative or
manager, and for infrastructure spending.   Might this be institutional overload?  
An important lesson learned from California’s financing of city services gives us reason to
pause in our desire to create new local governments. During its population explosion of the 1970's,19
California responded with a new local government for each local service, and each new government
was given its own property tax rate.  This structure – designed to match marginal benefits to
marginal costs as well – would have been fine with stable tax rates, but in California’s booming
housing market and with court required property reassessments, constant fine tuning of property tax
rates became a necessity.  When local tax rates were not adjusted downward, the many local
governments received large, and largely unintended, increases in homeowner tax revenues.  To
check this explosion in tax payments, California residents had to complain to as many as ten separate
local governments.  Citizen control collapsed under the weight of too many local governments.  In
the end, the only answer was a state-wide cap on total local property taxation at 1% of assessed
value, a law  known as Proposition 13; see Oakland, 1979.  The loss of local control over local
taxation led to a decline in overall spending on local services, on local schools in particular, and a
fall in the overall quality of city services; see Sonstelie, et. al. (2000).  
The proposals here for city financing are not so extreme.  The lines for service and tax
responsibilities are clearly drawn between the proposed layers of city government, and each resident
or firm must decide at most three local tax rates and monitor at most two local governments.  This
is the current institutional oversight now expected of most suburban residents and firms. There is
no reason to believe city residents and firms are not up to these tasks as well.   
IV.  City Finances and City Value
The economic contribution of city finances to the welfare and profitability of city residents
and firms is best measured by what those outside the city are willing to pay to live and work within
the city.  As long as the benefits from city services exceeds the costs paid through taxes or user fees20
to consume those services, then households and firms now outside the city will find moving into the
city an attractive option.  To consume city services, however, new entrants will need to buy an
“admission ticket” into the city.  This ticket is a parcel of city land.  The price of land will rise until
it fully reflects the net gain from city services – benefits minus costs – to firms and households now
in, or planning to locate in, the city.  Efficient city finances maximize service benefits minus service
costs, and as a consequence, city land values as well; see Brueckner (1983).  A footprint of more
efficient city finances is therefore rising city land prices.  There is growing evidence that adopting
the service and tax assignments and the institutions of governance recommended in Table 1 will do
just that. 
Service Assignment and Value: Among city services, the most important mis-assignment,
at least for U.S. cities, is the required shared fiscal responsibility for poverty services to low-income
city residents, services such as public housing, public medical care, child foster care, income
transfers and administration.  Currently, mandated poverty expenditures impose a tax burden on city
middle class families and city firms averaging $400 (Philadelphia) to as much as $600 (New York
City) per taxpaying family or about 1 percent of median family income.  Not surprisingly, middle
class  families will be discouraged from locating in such cities, and to the extent city businesses
share in this fiscal burden, so too will firms.  City land values will decline.  Haughwout and Inman
(2002), for example, estimate econometrically that over the decades 1970 to 1990 a 10 percent
increase in the rate of city poverty, say from .20 to .22, reduced median city home values in U.S.
cities by 8 percent in small cities (MSA’s with less than 250,000 residents) to 15 percent in large
cities (MSA’s with greater than 250,000 residents), even after controlling for fiscal assignment and
other city fixed effects. 21
There are three possible effects at work here.  The first is simply redistributive; the second
and third have important consequences for city economic efficiency.  The redistributive effect arises
from the fact that the city budget takes tax money from middle class families living in the median
value home and gives those resources to low income families.   For example, a $400 transfer from
city taxpayers to low income residents reduces the value of taxpaying properties by approximately
$10,000 if there is full market capitalization at a 4 percent real market interest rate (- $10,000 = -
$400/.04), roughly a 16 percent fall in a large U.S. city’s median home value of $60,000 in 2000.
By this reasoning, a 10 percent increase in the city’s share of families in poverty  (or equivalently
in city poverty spending) will reduce middle income home values by an additional $1,000, or by 1.6
percent.  While significant to be sure, such fiscal redistributions alone do not account for the 8 to15
percent effect of poverty on city land values as estimated by Haughwout and Inman (2002).
Something more must be going on.
Haughwout and Inman (2002) suggest that part of the larger effect may be due poverty
spending’s adverse effect on city agglomeration economies as middle class families and firms leave
the city as their taxes rise or services decline.  The resulting fall in city productive efficiency leads
to a further decline in city attractiveness and thus land values.  Haughwout-Inman provide an
estimate of this second, indirect effect of poverty spending using a general equilibrium model of
an open city economy with agglomeration.  Calibrated to match the Philadelphia metropolitan
economy and the best recent evidence on the economic advantages of city agglomeration, they find
a 10 percent increase in city poverty leads to a 10 percent decline in city land values.  By the
model’s specification, this 10 percent decline in value includes both the direct redistribution effect
of having more poor families, leading to the direct 1.6 percent fall in value, plus the indirect fiscal22
effect of lost city agglomeration economies, accounting for the remaining 8.4 percent fall in value.
This 8.4 percent fall in land values is an estimate of the adverse efficiency effect of mandated
poverty spending on the city’s private economy.   Still there remains, at least by Haughwout-Inman’s
estimates for large cities, an additional 5 percent adverse effect of poverty on city land values not
yet explained.  What else is going on?  A third adverse effect,  now a spillover  from city poverty
to the cost of providing public services to city residents is one possible answer.  K-12 education
(Dunscombe and Yinger, 1997) and police services (Raphael, This Volume) are likely to be the most
affected city services.  
The solution to the mis-assignment of poverty spending to cities is to remove the associated
unfunded mandates from the city’s budget, either directly through state or federal provision or
equivalently through state or federal funding of the mandates.  Further, if city poverty imposes added
production costs for the provision of city services, then matching aid to cover these added costs will
be appropriate; see Dunscombe and Yinger (1997).  The effects will be exactly what one would
expect – a more efficient city economy and rising city land values (Inman, 2003a).
Tax Assignment and Value: Among city taxes, the most important mis-assignment, again
prominent in U.S. cities, is to allow the use of business taxes to finance residential services.  The
resulting fiscal redistribution from firms to households discourages firm location within the city,
reduces city agglomeration economies and productive efficiency, and thereby depresses city land
values.  The available empirical evidence strongly suggest city business taxes drive business from
the city; see Bartik (1991).  Haughwout, et. al. (2004) provide a detailed look at the effects of city
sales and labor taxes on the city economies of New York City and Philadelphia over the decades
1970-2000.  Given the mobility of shoppers across city boundaries, sales taxes (New York City) and23
gross receipts taxes (Philadelphia) will be largely born by city firms.  City sales decline and firms
leave the city to avoid the tax.  Haughwout et. al.’s estimates of the elasticity of city sales with
respect to the two taxes are large and statistically significant: -. 5 for New York City and - .3 for
Philadelphia.  City wage or income taxes have much the same effect.  While nominally levied on
city residents – though both New York City and Philadelphia also taxed commuters directly during
the period of the study – the tax can be avoided by choosing to live, and mostly likely then work,
outside the city.  This requires city firms to raise city wages by an amount equal to the burden of tax
so as to attract workers to the firm.  Again a portion of the tax is born by city firms, and firms leave
the city.  Haughwout et. al.’s estimates of the elasticity of city jobs with respect to city income taxes
are also significant: -. 2 for New York City and - .4 for Philadelphia.  The larger effect for
Philadelphia likely reflects the relatively larger tax rate on commuters in this city, a tax whose direct
burden is more nearly fully born by city firms.  
While business taxes drive firms from cities, it is not obvious that city land values fall.
Residents still benefit from the fiscal redistribution.  Land values may rise if the residents’ demands
for city locations more than offsets lost business demand. This does not appear to be the case,
however, when agglomeration economies are present.  A general equilibrium analysis of the
Philadelphia city economy finds that even with modest agglomeration the elasticity of city land
values with respect to business taxation can be sizeable: - 1.3 with respect to a tax on business
capital (Haughwout-Inman, 2002) and -.2 with respect to a wage or commuter tax on labor (Inman,
2003a).  Voith’s (2003) recent econometric study of the effects of the Philadelphia commuter wage
tax on city property values finds comparable elasticities.  
As recommended by Table 1, the solution here is to substitute business land taxation and24
business user fees for direct taxes on business sales, capital, and labor.  Pittsburgh did just this in
1979 as part of an overall economic development reform.  The city significantly increased the rate
of land taxation, offered exemptions from taxation on new business structures, and held the line on
city wage taxation.  The tax reforms appear to have made a significant difference for the Pittsburgh
economy.  Oates and Schwab (1997) compared the trend in the value of new building permits (a
correlate with city land values) in fifteen cities in the industrial Midwest  over the decades 1960-
1989.  Until 1979, the trend is either flat or downward in all cities including Pittsburgh; cities were
either stagnant or in decline.  After the 1979 tax reforms, however, Pittsburgh breaks away from the
group and shows a significant upward jump in the value of new construction by an amount nearly
sufficient to offset in ten years the previous twenty years of declines.  Oates and Schwab are careful
to note that such business tax reforms alone will not save a declining city, but if residents and firms
want to live and work in a particular location – and Pittsburgh in the 1980's was such a city – then
an efficient tax structure allows the city to reach its full economic potential. 
Governance and Value: Though the appropriate assignments of spending responsibilities
and  financing instruments are necessary for efficient city finances, they are not sufficient.  City
politicians who implement those assignments must have an incentive to do so in ways that maximize
the economic net fiscal benefits to city residents and firms.  The institutions of city governance must
align the political interests of elected city officials to the economic interests of those who live and
work within the city.  Table 1 suggests that fiscal competition between local neighborhood
governments for services that can be efficiently provided to small communities of say 10,000 to
20,000 families coupled with a strong mayor form of governance for city-wide services and
infrastructure might be such a governance structure.  What’s the evidence?   25
There is little doubt that citizens are willing to pay for good local public services offered at
low tax rates and that they do so through the purchase of land in communities or neighborhoods that
offer a favored fiscal package; see Rubinfeld (1987).  When the service and tax package is
efficiently provided then local land values will be maximized; see Brueckner (1983).  Communities
that over- or underspend relative to resident preferences will see their land values decline.  Barrow
and Rouse (2004) use this observation to econometrically test for the efficiency in the provision of
K-12 education across 9,000 local school districts in the United States; overspending districts will
see their property values decline as spending increases.   This is indeed what Barrow and Rouse find.
Most relevant for the arguments here, their results strongly support the proposition that fiscal
competition encourages fiscal efficiency.  Efficient school districts are more likely to be found in
counties with many school districts, and all else equal, central city school districts are less efficient
than small and median sized school districts.  Further, it appears to be fiscal choice by residents that
provides the discipline.  Brueckner’s (1982) study of Massachusetts communities in fiscal year 1976
reached much the same conclusions as Barrow and Rouse, but then in November, 1980
Massachusetts passed Proposition 2½ limiting local taxation to 2.5 percent of local property values.
Those communities not in compliance with the law were required to reduce revenues and spending
until the constraint was met.  Examining local property values in 1992, Lang and Jian (2004) found
that all communities facing a binding spending limitation suffered significant declines in local
property values.  Choice plus competition appear to promote local government fiscal efficiency.
Still large cities seem immune to these disciplinary pressures.  
One possible explanation for overspending in large U.S. cities is the control over service
provision given to public employee unions where state law requires an “explicit-duty-to-bargain.”26
 Residents in these cities cannot set wages, benefits, and employment levels (e.g., class size for
education) without an agreement with the union.  “Contracting out” also must be negotiated.  If the
net effect of such strong unionization is fiscal inefficiency, then residents and firms who can leave
the city will choose to do so.  City land values should decline.  This is just what Haughwout and
Inman (2002) find in their study of large city finances, where cities with strong unions depress city
land values by an average of 12 percent.   The fact that suburban land values also decline in the
MSA’s with strong union cities – by an average of 7 percent – suggests these fiscal inefficiencies
lead to private sector inefficiencies as well, presumably through lost agglomeration economies as
firms and middle income households leave the city; see Haughwout and Inman (2002).  Fiscal
competition provided by neighborhood governments with neighborhood negotiated labor contracts
or contracting out generally could serve to check these union-induced fiscal inefficiencies; see
Hoxby (1996). 
A second explanation for large city fiscal inefficiencies is the need for political logrolls
between locally elected city legislators when deciding the city’s budget.  The evidence is clear that
such deal-making leads to higher spending – about $450 more per city family when council size is
doubled – and that a strong mayor with a veto can fully neutralize the increases; see Baqir (2002).
But is this extra spending inefficient?   The evidence from Haughwout and Inman (2002) is again
suggestive on the point.  Property values in large cities with council-only form of governance are
4 percent lower than in city’s with strong mayor governance, a lose in value of about $2100 per
central city home.  So too in the suburbs, as this apparent fiscal inefficiency induces a less efficient
private economy with lost agglomeration economies;  in MSA’s whose cities have council-only
governance, suburban property values are 5 percent lower, or a loss of about $2,800 per suburban27
home.  
We should also ask: How inefficient is this extra spending?  Combining the Baqir spending
estimates with the Haughwout-Inman capitalization estimates – both studies sample all large U.S.
cities in the 1990's – suggests, with a bit of creative accounting, that each extra dollar of council-
only spending generates perhaps only $.33 in net economic benefits.   From Haughwout-Inman, the
total loss in MSA property values because of council-only governance is $7,700/city family (=
$2,100/city family + [$2,800/suburban family]A2 suburban families/city family) or $300/city family
in lost economic value per year assuming a real interest rate of 4 percent (= .04A$7,700).  From
Baqir, council-only governance adds about $450 per year in city spending.  Thus, the net economic
gain from council-induced spending is only $150/city family (= $450/city family - $300/city family),
or about $.33 per marginal dollar spent. While only an example, these calculations make a quite
general point.  The institutions of fiscal governance, like those of fiscal assignment, matter for
ensuring an efficient city.
VI. Conclusion
All economies do two things: first create and then divide an economic surplus.  City
economies are no different.  What make city economies unique and therefore not easily reproducible
are their natural location advantages and their, perhaps historically dictated, agglomeration
economies.   For aggregate economic efficiency, a well run city government is essential, providing
those goods and services that best complement the city’s private economy.  Public infrastructure
investments in access and local roads and public transit, in waste disposal, in telecommunications,
in electrical generation and distribution and on-going service provision for K-12 education, public28
safety, environmental quality, public health, and the cultural life of residents are all part of the
efficient city’s service portfolio.  The appropriate financial instruments to fund these services are
income and/or property taxes on city residents and  land taxes and user fees on city firms.  To ensure
that each dollar of  revenues raised provides at least a compensating dollar of benefit in services
provided, city governance must allow for competition and choice when the efficient scale of city
services are relatively small and strong, but democratically elected, mayoral leadership when the
efficient scale of services is city-wide.  The evidence suggests that such a structure of fiscal
assignment and governance goes a long way towards ensuring an economically efficient, surplus
maximizing city. 
It is in dividing the city’s surplus that fiscal inefficiencies might then arise.  Requiring cities
to fund a  significant share of poverty services for low income households, allowing residents to tax
business assets to pay for residential services, granting public employee unions monopoly control
over the provision of public services, and adopting a system of fiscal governance which encourages
a “something-for-everyone” budget all lead to a less efficient public sector and, in the end, a less
efficient private sector too.
The central lesson of this essay is clear: Efficient city finances facilitate efficient private
economies, but we must leave to city finances those tasks it can do well, namely, the provision of
public services that facilitate the city’s competitive position in the wider private market economy.TABLE 1: FINANCING CITIES EFFICIENTLY
LOCAL SERVICE FINANCED BY: ORGANIZED AS: GOVERNED BY: ASSISTANCE BY:
RESIDENTIAL SERVICES:
K-12 Education Neighborhood Residential
Property or Income Taxation
or Resident User Fees
Neighborhood
Council 
Majority Rule in a
Neighborhood Council








Property or Income Taxation Neighborhood
Council
Majority Rule in a
Neighborhood Council









Property or Income Taxation
or Resident User Fees
Neighborhood
Council with an
Option to Contract to
a  Private Firm
Majority Rule in a
Neighborhood Council







City Surcharge on Residential
Property or Income Taxation City Mayor
Strong City Mayor Elected by







City Surcharge on Residential
Property or Income Taxation
plus User Fees
City Mayor with an
Option to Contract to
a  Private Firm
Strong City Mayor Elected by







City-Wide Debt Paid for by
City Surcharge on Residential
Property or Income Taxation
plus User Fees
City Mayor with an
Option to Contract to
a  Private Firm
Strong City Mayor Elected by
One Person One Vote of City
Residents
– BUSINESS SERVICES:
Police/Fire Patrols Business District Land Taxes




Majority Rule in a Business
District Council Elected by







Business District Land Taxes
or Business User Fees
Business District with
an Option to Contract
to a  Private Firm 
Majority Rule in a Business
District Council Elected by








Airports and Ports 
City-Wide Debt Paid for by
City Surcharge on Residential
and Business Taxation  plus
User Fees
City Mayor with an
Option to Contract to
a  Private Firm
Strong City Mayor Elected by
One Person One Vote of City
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